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SUMMARY 
Soybean consumption in Indonesia increased from approximately 2.0 million tons 
in the beginning of the 1990s to 2.4 million tons in 2002.  At the same time, production 
declined from 1.86 million tons in 1992 to 0.87 million tons in 2001, following a more 
than 50 percent decline in harvested area.  
 
At least part of the decline in production is due to a decrease in the soybean import 
tariff that was reduced from 20 percent in 1998 to 5 percent in 2001.  Farm groups have 
argued that this tariff should be reinstituted despite the negative effects that it would have 
on consumers.  
 
The present study, using the Policy Analysis Matrix methodology, demonstrates 
that, even at the current levels of productivity, soybeans yield a profitable return to land 
and management at both private and social prices.  Farmers who have switched to the new 
seeds developed by Indonesian researchers have been able to increase productivity (and 
profits) substantially.  This finding suggests that government efforts to reintroduce import 
tariffs on soybeans would be undesirable and would lead to inefficiencies in the use of 
domestic resources.  
 
Government investments in soybean production that are likely to have a high 
benefit-cost ratio are extension activities that educate farmers on the proper seed bed 
preparation and planting procedures for the new varieties as well as cold storage facilities 
that hold seeds at the proper temperature before planting.  General improvements in credit 
facilities that make it easier for farmers to innovate would also be desirable.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background 
Soybean consumption in Indonesia increased from approximately 2.0 million tons 
in the beginning of the 1990s to 2.4 million tons in 2001.  The increase in consumption, 
however, was not accompanied by production gains.  Production declined from 1.86 
million tons in 1992 to 0.87 million tons in 2001, following a more than 50% decline in 
harvested area.  Consequently, Indonesian soybean imports doubled in the last ten years 
from 0.54 million tons in 1990 to 1.28 million tons 2000.  
 
The decrease in production and the resultant increase in soybean imports are often 
attributed to the government’s policy to remove soybean import tariffs.  The Minister of 
Industry and Trade Decision No. 406/MPP/Kep/11/1997 also removed BULOG’s role in 
soybean marketing.  While these policies are aimed at helping the soybean agro-industries 
– mostly small enterprises – to get raw material cheaply and easily, they are not in line 
with Treasury Minister Decision No. 543/KMK-01/1997.  In January 1998, soybean 
imports were charged an import tariff of 20% that gradually decreased to 5% in 2003.   
 
Because cultivated area and production have declined significantly, it is important 
to analyze both the efficiency and competitiveness of soybean farming systems.  Current 
productivity commonly falls between 0.9 to 1.2 tons per ha, and soybean competitiveness 
may be low.  However, new varieties introduced by the University of Jember, e.g. Baluran, 
yield more than 3.6 tons per ha in experimental trials.  Data from farmers’ fields show that 
soybean farmers using these varieties in the last two planting seasons increased their 
productivity to between 1.7 and 3.2 tons per ha, with an average of 2.25 tons per ha.  
 
Local governments would like to promote these improved varieties and are 
considering possible measures toward this end.  These include controlling the distribution 
of the improved soybean seed, providing cool storage for improved seed germination, 
subsidizing the seed price, and conducting or establishing a specific extension program.  
This study will seek to identify whether it is worthwhile for the Jember district government 
to spend considerable resources to support the spread of the new soybean technology.  
 
The Indonesian farmer associations (e.g., HKTI) and some other institutions claim 
that more direct protection of farmers is needed, and they propose increasing the import 
tariff on soybean to 50 percent.  The purpose of (temporary) protection would be to give 
farmers more profits, so they could save and invest in the adoption of the new 
technologies.  (This strategy is particularly important, it is argued, because of the lack of 
credit facilities available to farmers.)   
 
Because increasing the import tariff would transfer consumer income to soybean 
farmers, this study will provide evidence on whether the farmers’ argument makes sense.  
The research results will also consider other agricultural systems and international policies.  
1.2.  Research Area and Respondents 
The study was conducted in Rambipuji and Bangsalsari sub-districts, Jember 
District, East Java Province.  Jember District is located in the eastern part of East Java, 
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approximately 200 km east of Surabaya.   Average annual rainfall is approximately 2400 
mm.  The highest rainfall area may receive 3000 mm, but the lowest rainfall area gets only 
1600 mm per annum.  In Rambipuji and Bangsalsari, the rainfall averages between 2000 
and 2100 mm per annum.  
 
A total of 2.1 million people live in Jember – 250,000 (11 %) in urban areas and 
1,850,000 (89 %) in rural areas.  The agricultural sector is the sector with the highest 
contribution to the region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  It contributes more than 50 
per cent of the regional GDP.  While most of the agriculture contributions to GDP are 
derived from estate and plantation crops, the roles of food and legumes crops are 
important.  Approximately 800,000 tons of paddy and 300,000 tons of corn are produced 
annually in this region.  
  
Total soybean production in Jember District in 2001 reached 34,534 tons.  Soybean 
cultivation occurs in 22 of 31 sub-districts, with total harvested area of 25,235 ha in 2001.  
The average productivity in 2001 was 1.37 tons.  
 
A total of 60 farmers were interviewed in this study.  The distribution of 
respondents in each sub-district is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the Respondents based on Districts and Soybean Variety 
Planted  
Number of Respondents 
Sub District Planting new 
variety 
Planting common 
variety 
Total Percent 
Rambipuji 10 15 25 41.7 
Bangsalsari 20 15 35 58.3 
Total 30 30 60 100 
 
Most farmers in the villages have a seasonal cropping pattern of paddy – paddy – 
soybean, some practice paddy – paddy – corn, and only a small number apply other 
cropping patterns.  Nine (30%) of the respondents planted the new variety (Baluran) last 
year; the other 21 respondents plan to start planting Baluran this year.  
 
The majority of soybean farmers are small farmers, with an average farm size of 
less than 1.0 hectare.  The respondents’ farm sizes ranged from a minimum of 0.13 ha to a 
maximum of 3.0 ha.  Thirty (50%) of the respondents cultivated less than 0.5 ha.  Only 12 
(20%) of the respondents cultivated more than 1.0 ha. 
 
Although most farmers in the village have been members of farmer groups for a 
long time, many stated that they have not benefited enough from their groups.  Farmers 
usually buy their farm inputs from private suppliers, individually.  They may buy soybean 
seed either from input kiosks, informal input suppliers (usually also output buyer/traders), 
or directly from the seed company supplier.  Some farmers stated that last year they got the 
new variety free from a local government program in cooperation with the University of 
Jember.  But this year most farmers bought the new variety.  A distribution company, Agri 
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Soya Industrindo, controlled most of the distribution of the new variety.  Price per 
kilogram of the new variety (Baluran) seed is higher than of the varieties commonly 
planted, including Galunggung.  However, the seed rate required per hectare for the new 
variety is less than that of older varieties.  
 
The main reason that farmers plant the new variety is that it is more productive than 
traditional varieties.  The pods-per-plant ratio of the new variety is significantly greater.  
Pest and disease resistance is similar to traditional varieties.  However, because the new 
variety’s seed membrane is thicker than that of the older varieties, it requires extra care 
during the germination period.  If the soil is too wet or too dry, the seed will not germinate.  
To gain better seed germination, farmers must be able to control moisture during the 
germination period.  The new variety, therefore, is unlikely to be suitable for use in dry-
land areas.  Despite greater perceived risks, farmers planting the new variety expect a 
greater yield and thus higher profit from planting soybeans.    
1.3. Research Objectives 
The main objectives of this study are to measure the efficiency and competitiveness 
of soybean farming systems in Jember and to explain the impact of government policies on 
these systems. 
 
This study seeks to: 
 
• identify whether it is worthwhile for the Jember district government to spend 
resources to support the establishment of new varieties for increasing the efficiency 
and competitiveness of local soybean farming; and 
 
• provide evidence whether increasing the soybean import tariff is needed to give 
profits to soybean farmers.  
 7
 
2. RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Data and Sources of Data 
Both primary and secondary data were used in the study.  The primary data were 
collected in a field survey in two sub-districts, i.e., Rambipuji and Bangsalsari. The 
sampling method was proportionate stratified sampling based on the soybean variety 
planted by the farmers, i.e., common variety and new soybean variety.  For each variety, 
30 farmers were interviewed.  Prior to the field survey, a preliminary survey was 
conducted to collect information required to test the questionnaire.  Secondary data were 
collected from several related institutions, e.g., farmer groups, agro-industry associations, 
marketer associations, and government agencies, to support the primary data. 
2.2.  Method of Analysis 
The method of analysis utilized to measure the efficiency and competitiveness of 
soybean farming systems was the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM)1.  The PAM measures the 
profitability at both private (actual market) and social (efficiency) prices.  This method 
shows the actual revenues, costs, and profits that the soybean farmers are experiencing and 
compares them with what they would face if commodities and resources were priced at 
international prices or domestic opportunity costs.  
 
A study on the impacts of the on-going policy is important for restructuring 
soybean systems.  PAM will give measures of the competitiveness and the economic 
efficiency of existing systems and of the impacts of policy on those systems.  The main 
limitation of PAM is that its results are for a base year and thus it may need to be altered as 
principal parameters (e.g. world prices, exchange rate, interest rate and taxation) eventually 
change.  The method, nevertheless, can readily accommodate such parameter changes.  In 
this regard, a sensitivity analysis (a simulation) will be utilized to study the impact of such 
changes.  
 
The PAM table consists of private and social profitability in its first and second 
rows and divergences in its third row. The data entered in the first row provide a measure 
of private profitability.  The term private refers to revenues and costs reflecting actual 
market prices received or paid by farmers, merchants, or processors in the system.  These 
market prices incorporate the underlying economic costs and valuations plus effects of all 
policies and market failures.  
 
The values entered in the second row of the matrix provide a measure of social 
profitability.  Social prices are efficiency prices that would be received by farmers in the 
absence or government policies or market failures.  These valuations measure comparative 
advantage or efficiency of agricultural systems.  Details of the Policy Analysis Matrix 
(PAM) and indicators derived from the matrix are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Monke and Pearson, 1989 
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Table 2. The Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) 
Inputs  
Revenues Tradable 
Inputs 
Domestic 
Factors 
Profits 
Private prices A B C D1 
Social prices E F G H2 
Effect of divergences I3 J4 K5 L6 
 
1) Private Profits: D = A – B – C 
2) Social Profits:   H = E – F – G 
3) Output Transfers: I = A – E 
4) Input Transfers: J = B – F 
5) Factor Transfers: K = C – G 
6) Net Transfers: L = D – H or L = I – J – K 
2.3.  Ratio Indicators 
a) Private Cost Ratio:
)( BA
CPCR −=  
 
PCR is the ratio of factor costs (C) to value added in private prices (A-B).  This 
ratio measures the competitiveness of a commodity system.  The system is competitive if 
PCR is less than 1. 
 
b) Domestic Resource Cost Ratio:
)( FE
GDRC −=   
DRC serves as a proxy measure of social profits.  Minimizing the DRC is thus 
equivalent to maximizing social profits.  The comparative advantage of a commodity 
system can be assessed by using this ratio.  If DRC is less than 1, the system uses domestic 
resources efficiently and has a comparative advantage. 
 
Nominal Protection Coefficient; 
c) Output: 
E
A=NPCO  
This ratio shows the extent to which domestic prices for output differ from social 
prices.  If NPCO is greater than 1, the domestic output price is greater than the import (or 
export) price and thus the system receives protection.  On the contrary, if NPCO is less 
than 1, the system is disprotected by policy. 
 
d) Input: 
F
B=NPCI  
This ratio shows how much domestic prices for tradable inputs differ from their 
social prices.  If NPCI exceeds 1, the domestic input cost is greater than the comparable 
world prices and thus the system is taxed by policy.  If NPCI is less than 1, the system is 
subsidized by policy    
e) Effective Protection Coefficient: 
)(
)(
FE
BAEPC −
−=  
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This ratio compares the value added in domestic prices (A – B) with value added in 
world prices (E – F).  The purpose is to show the joint effect of policy transfer affecting 
both tradable outputs and tradable inputs.     
f) Profitability Coefficient: 
H
D=PC  
This ratio measures the impact of all transfers on the private profits.  It equals the 
ratio of private profits to social profits.  
g) Subsidy Ratio to Producers: 
E
LSRP =   or 
E
HDSRP −=  
SRP is a single measure of all transfer effects.  The SRP indicates the extent to 
which the system revenues are increased or decreased because of transfers.  If the market 
failures are insignificant, the SRP shows the net impact of distorting policies on the system 
revenues. 
 
2.4.  Empirical Information and Assumptions 
The basic data collected were commodity and input prices and quantities for 
representative farms and for post-farm marketing.  World prices were used to compute the 
import and export parity prices for tradables.  Social prices for domestic resources (wages, 
interest rates) were estimated by correcting private prices for potential divergences.   
 
To ensure that the budget data were complete and reliable, figures were compiled 
from agricultural census data (provided by the Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS)), 
information from farmer groups and agro-industry associations, and estimates from the 
field surveys.  There were two principal assumptions used in this study – that the social 
value of capital was 6.7 percent (for one planting season) plus the rate of inflation and that 
the social value of farm labor was the same as the private value of farm labor (the 
minimum wage rate did not apply in the farming sector).  Historical budget data were used 
to support the basic policy data. 
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3. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
3.1.  Interpretation of Findings 
Empirical results of the study first describe the level of efficiency and 
competitiveness of both soybean farming-systems, i.e., common planted variety and 
improved variety, in the base year 2002.  The following table provides the PAM for 
soybean farming systems using the two different varieties – Galunggung (common planted 
variety) and Baluran (new variety).  Both soybeans were moderately irrigated.  They were 
planted in June 2002 and harvested in September 2002.  
 
Table 3.  Policy Analysis Matrices for Soybean Farming Systems in Jember, 2002 
  Revenue Tradable  Profit2 
    Inputs Labor Capital Total   
Common Variety             
Private 3,107,580 534,654 724,760 131,707 856,467 1,716,459
Social 3,087,686 480,621 724,760 77,711 802,471 1,804,594
Divergences 19,894 54,033 0 53,996 53,996 -88,135
   
DRC = 0.31;   PCR = 0.33;   PBCR = 2.23 
New Variety             
Private 3,931,221 659,159 742,185 151,860 894,045 2,378,018
Social 3,841,604 614,815 742,185 90,090 832,275 2,394,514
Divergences 89,618 44,344 0 61,770 61,770 -16,497
   
DRC = 0.26;   PCR = 0.27;   PBCR = 2.53 
 
Table 3 shows the PAM table for both soybean-farming systems.  Because this 
study was unable to collect PAM data for corn3 as the next best alternative crop after 
soybeans, the social opportunity costs (SOC)4 of land could not be estimated.  Profits for 
both systems in the table thus reflect returns to management and land.  The table shows 
that farmers planting the new variety received 38.5 percent higher private profit (D) than 
those who cultivated the common variety.  The profit of the new variety, Rp. 2,378,018, is 
higher than the profit of the common variety, Rp. 1,716,459.  The PBCR for the new 
variety (2.53) is 13.3 percent higher than that of the traditional variety (2.23).  Since the 
private profits defined in the table are the return to management and land, with a given 
private land rate of Rp. 1,050,000, the net private profitability (the residual return to 
management) for the new variety and the common variety were Rp. 1,328,018 and Rp. 
666,459, respectively. 
 
The higher private profit of the new variety was caused mainly by increased seed 
productivity.  The average productivity of the new variety, 1.7 tons per hectare, was 
approximately 20 percent higher than the average productivity of the common variety, 1.4 
tons per hectare.  Although this yield improvement was modest, costs were only very 
slightly higher.  The result was that profits were significantly higher.    
                                                 
2 Profit is defined as return to management and land 
3 Alternative cropping pattern, p. 7 
4 SOC of land is defined as the social profit of the next best alternative crop excluding land 
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 Comparative and Competitive Advantage of the Soybean Farming Systems  
The ability of an agricultural system to compete without distorting government 
policies can be strengthened or eroded by changes in economic conditions.  Dynamic 
comparative advantage refers to shifts in competitiveness that occur over time because of 
changes in three categories of economic parameters – long-run world prices of tradable 
outputs and inputs, social opportunity costs of domestic factors of production (labor, 
capital and land), and production technologies used in farming or marketing.  Collectively, 
these three parameters determine comparative advantage.   
   
Comparative advantage of an agricultural system, in the PAM table, is indicated by 
the value of the Domestic Resources Cost Ratio (DRCR or DRC).  The DRC, defined as 
G/(E-F), serves as a proxy measure for social profits.  Minimizing the DRC is equivalent to 
maximizing social profits.  Comparative advantage is an indicator of potential advantage 
and will be fully received if there is no policy distortion in the system.  If a commodity has  
comparative advantage, its production is economically efficient. 
 
Based on information provided in Table 3, the DRCs of both soybean-farming 
systems were much less than 1.  The DRCs for the common variety and new variety 
soybean systems were 0.31 and 0.26, respectively.  This result indicates that both soybean 
systems had a strong comparative advantage.  The common variety system was less 
efficient than the new one.  In other words, the new variety system had a better 
comparative advantage compared to the common variety system. 
 
The determination of profit actually received by farmers is a straightforward and 
important initial result of the PAM approach.  The results indicate which farmers are 
currently competitive.  In the PAM table, the competitiveness of a system is measured by 
the private profitability (D) or Private Cost Ratio (PCR).  Based on information given in 
Table 3, the PCR of both soybean systems was much less than 1.  This result indicates that 
both systems were profitable and thus competitive.  The lower value of PCR for the new 
variety system (0.27) compared to the value of PCR for the common variety systems (0.33) 
suggests that the new variety system was more competitive than the common variety 
system. 
 Transfers and Impacts of Government Policies 
In the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM), impacts of government policies can be 
identified by the divergences identity in the third row of the PAM table.  Divergences 
cause private prices to differ from their social counterparts.  A divergence arises either 
because a distorting policy intervenes to cause a private market price to diverge from an 
efficient price or because underlying market forces have failed to provide an efficient 
price.  Divergences in PAM can also be indicated by the ratio between the values in the 
first row (private prices) and the values in the second row (social prices).  The ratio 
indicators are more frequently used because of their ability to compare different systems 
producing unlike outputs.  
    
The ratio formed to measure output transfers is called the Nominal Protection 
Coefficient on Output (NPCO).  Output transfers in the two soybean systems were only 
slightly different.  The NPCO for the common variety and the new variety were 1.01 and 
1.02, respectively.  Both values of the NPCO were greater than 1.  This result indicates that 
soybean farmers for both systems received slightly higher prices than they would have 
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received facing world prices or that the systems were receiving very slight protection.  The 
positive output transfers were caused mainly by indirect quantitative restriction (quotas) on 
soybean imports.  A slight difference in divergences between the new variety and the 
common variety was due to the new variety gaining a better price in the market.  A 
comparison of output transfers for both soybean systems is presented in Table 4.   
Table 4. Output Transfers of Soybean Farming Systems in Jember 
  Total Revenue NPCO 
      
Common Variety     
Private 3,107,580 1.01 
Social 3,087,686  
Divergences 19,894  
New Variety    
Private 3,931,221 1.02 
Social 3,841,604  
Divergences 89,618  
 
On the input side, the values of NPCI(s) for both farming systems exceeded 1.  The 
NPCI for the common variety and the new variety systems were 1.11 and 1.07, 
respectively.  This result indicates that both systems were taxed by policy.  Details of the 
input transfers of soybean farming systems in Jember are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Tradable Input Transfers of Soybean Farming Systems in Jember 
Tradable Input Costs 
   Seed Urea TSP 
Other 
fertilizer Pesticide Total NPCI 
Common Variety              
Private 209,220 70,595 82,593 79,810 92,436 534,654 1.11
Social 188,928 69,426 72,846 75,473 73,949 480,621 
Divergences 20,292 1,169 9,747 4,338 18,487 54,033 
New Variety              
Private 240,120 57,408 95,220 110,400 156,011 659,159 1.07
Social 240,120 57,304 88,182 104,400 124,809 614,815 
Divergences 0 104 7,038 6,000 31,202 44,344 
 
Distribution and import regulations on seed5 and fertilizer6, import tariffs (up to 
20%) on pesticides, and local distribution taxes (retribution) have contributed to higher 
private prices for inputs.  A new variety of seed, produced locally, is a nontradable input. 
In the absence of government taxes on domestic seed production and distribution, soybean 
farmers thus paid the social price for the new seed variety.  This has resulted in a slightly 
smaller NPCI for the new variety system compared to the common variety system.  
 
The Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) shows the joint effect of policy 
transfers affecting both tradable inputs and tradable outputs.  These are almost equal to 1 
                                                 
5 E.g., to gain reduction and or exclusion of import tariff, a seed importer must be the agricultural commodity producer 
(subject to KEPMENKEU No. 135/1997).  
6 Fertilizer import and distribution are mostly given and controlled by National Fertilizer Producers (PUSRI, PUPUK KUJANG, 
PETROKIMIA, etc.) 
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for both systems.  The EPC for the common variety and the new variety systems were 0.99 
and 1.01, respectively.  These results imply that there was no significant protection from 
the government to either system.  The EPCs of both soybean-farming systems in Jember 
are depicted in Table 6.   
 Table 6. Effective Protection Coefficients for Soybean Farming Systems in Jember  
  Revenue Tradable inputs costs EPC 
Common Variety      
Private 3.107.580 534,654 0.99 
Social 3.087.686 480,621  
Divergences 19.894 54,033  
New Variety      
Private 3.931.221 659,159 1.01 
Social 3.841.604 614,815  
Divergences 89.618 44,344  
 
There were few signs of market failures in the domestic factor markets.  The main 
cause of the divergences in factor transfers was the high private interest rate.  The private 
interest rate was 24% annually, higher than the social interest rate (20% annually) because 
of the underdeveloped state of the rural credit market, i.e. too few rural institutions for 
financial intermediation that are accessible for farmers.  Factor market transfers for both 
soybean-farming systems in Jember are described in Table 7.  Farmers usually take some 
inputs (credit) from their input suppliers at planting time and pay at harvesting time (yar-
nen)7. To increase the competitiveness of the system, long-term development of reliable 
rural financial institutions is required to give farmers better access to credit with lower 
interest rates.     
 
Table 7.  Domestic Factor Transfers of Soybean Farming Systems in Jember 
Domestic Factors   
  Labor Capital Total 
Common Variety       
Private 724,760 131,707 856,467 
Social 724,760 77,711 802,471 
Divergences 0 53,996 53,996 
New Variety       
Private 742,185 151,860 894,045 
Social 742,185 90,090 832,275 
Divergences 0 61,770 61,770 
 
The measure of net transfers is a principal result of the PAM approach.  A ratio 
indicator relating to the net transfers is the Profitability Coefficient (PC).  The Profitability 
Coefficient (PC) measures the impact of all transfers on private profits.  The PC is also an 
expansion of EPC to include domestic factor costs.  The PC for the common variety system 
and the new variety system were 0.95 and 0.99, respectively.  This result means that the net 
transfer caused a reduction in private profits for both soybean systems.  
 
                                                 
7 yar-nen (Bayar Panen) is a common acronym for payment system at harvesting time 
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Government policy has caused the common soybean system’s private profits to be 
5 percent less than they would have been without policy transfers.  Similarly, the new 
variety systems received 99 percent of their private profits or 1 percent less than they 
would receive in the absence of policy transfers.  Hence, government policy did not give 
any positive impact on the soybean farming systems.  Protection Coefficients (PC) for both 
soybean-farming systems are illustrated in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Net Transfers, Profitability Coefficients, and Subsidy Ratio to Producers for 
Soybean Farming Systems in Jember  
 
  Costs 
  
Revenue 
  
Tradable 
Inputs 
Domestic 
Factor 
Profit 
  
PC SRP 
Common Variety           
Private 3,107,580 534,654 856,467 1,716,459 0.95 - 0.029
Social 3,087,686 480,621 802,471 1,804,594  
Divergences 19,894 54,033 53,996 -88,135  
New Variety           
Private 3,931,221 659,159 894,045 2,378,018 0.99 - 0.004
Social 3,841,604 614,815 832,275 2,394,514  
Divergences 89,618 44,344 61,770 -16,497  
 
The subsidy ratio to producers (SRP) is a single measure of all transfer effects.  
This ratio is a comparison of the net transfer to the value of output in world prices.  The 
SRP thus indicates the extent to which the system’s revenues are increased or decreased 
due to transfers.  The SRP for the common variety and the new variety farming systems, 
respectively, were -0.029 and -0.004.  These negative values mean that divergences – 
generally influenced by distorting policies – have slightly decreased the gross profit of 
both soybean-farming systems in Jember. 
3.2.  Implications of Results 
The policy issue is whether the local government should spend resources for 
providing facilities (e.g., distribution control and cold storage) and supporting the 
expansion of the new varieties by subsidizing the seed costs.  The results of the study show 
that the new variety has significantly increased soybean profitability and competitiveness. 
In this regard, the government may provide assistance to the development, distribution, and 
adoption of the new variety.  Given the new variety characteristics and higher farmer 
perceived risks of planting the new variety, the government may support the establishment 
of the new variety by providing assistance in ensuring that the new seed can be efficiently 
produced and distributed along with more intensive extension programs so that farmers 
understand the advantages of planting the new variety.  
 
Although the removal of import tariffs favors consumers and the agro-industry 
sector, at current world prices, both soybean systems are still highly competitive.  It is, 
therefore, not worthwhile for the government to increase import tariffs, because increasing 
tariffs will create policy distortions and result in economic inefficiency.  Policies that 
provide effective extension and training programs for farmers will better increase 
productivity and thus profitability. 
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3.3.  International Impacts of Results 
Because this study suggests that increasing the import tariff is not the solution to 
increase the competitiveness of the soybean farming systems, this result has been in line 
with the international agreements, such as WTO, AFTA, and APEC. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4.1. Conclusions 
 
• Both soybean-farming systems, i.e., common variety and new variety, were 
efficient and competitive.  The competitiveness and efficiency of the new variety 
were greater than those of the common variety. 
 
• The private benefit cost ratio (PBCR) of the new variety system was 13% higher 
than the PBCR of the common variety system.  This result indicates that the new 
variety is more profitable than the common planted variety.  The higher value of 
PCR for the common variety system (0.33) compared to the value of PCR for the 
new variety system (0.27) also indicates that the new variety system was more 
competitive than the common variety system. 
 
• The DRC for the common variety system (0.31) was greater than that for the new 
variety system (0.26).  The new variety system thus had a better comparative 
advantage compared to the common variety system.  
  
• Government policies did not generate a positive impact on either soybean farming 
system.  The value of PC for both soybean-farming systems was less than 1.  The 
SRP for the common variety and the new variety farming systems were -0.029 and 
-0.004, respectively.  Divergences – generally influenced by distorting policies – 
have slightly decreased the profit of both soybean systems. 
4.2. Recommendations 
• The results of the study show that the new variety has significantly increased 
soybean profitability and competitiveness.  The government may provide assistance 
in ensuring that the new seed can be produced efficiently and distributed along with 
more intensive extension programs so that farmers understand the advantages of 
planting the new variety. 
 
• Both soybean-farming systems are efficient and competitive.  It is, therefore, not 
worthwhile for the government to increase the import tariff, since increasing the 
import tariff will generate greater policy distortion.  However, the long-term 
development of reliable rural financial institutions would give farmers better access 
to credit with lower interest rates and thus would increase the competitiveness of 
both systems. 
 
• While the new variety is found to be very productive and competitive, it is unlikely 
that the variety is suitable for dry land.  The new seeds require good to moderate 
irrigation (water control), particularly during the germination period.  
 
• Because of the new variety’s seed characteristics, an effective extension program is 
required for the success of the adoption and diffusion process. 
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